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Abstract 
The proliferation of e-services (e.g. e-commerce, e-health, 
e-government) within the emerging digital Identity 
Management Systems make Internet an undeniable 
convenient and powerful tool for users. However in this 
environment, users are required to manage several digital 
identities and a great number of personal data. As such, 
simplification of users’ involvement is highly needed while 
increasing the users’ confidence, and guaranteeing security. 
This paper proposes a low-cost authentication solution 
which leads to a reduction of users’ identities, even across 
several circles of trust, while maintaining high-level 
security.  This solution is  suitable for FC², a platform 
dedicated to manage digital identities within circles of trust. 
 
Key words:  Identity management system, public key 
infrastructure, federated identity, circle of trust, digital identity, 
security. 
1. Introduction 
With a boom in online services generally accessed through 
a lot of login-password couples, Internet users are having 
an ever increasing number of digital identities.  
Indeed, Internet was not originally designed with the 
digital identity idea and, some solutions have been 
proposed to deploy digital-identity management 
architectures using existing standards and protocols such 
as InfoCard standard that is a user-centric approach or 
Liberty Alliance standard that is based on the notion of 
identity federation.  
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A typical identity-management architecture requires basic 
components like an identity provider (IDP) that 
authenticates the user in a secure manner allowing him to 
access to a service provider (SP) and an attribute provider 
(AP) to supply the user attributes to any authorized agent 
while not compromising privacy.   
FC² (Federation of Circles of Trust) [1] is a French project 
initiated by several companies jointly with government and 
academic actors. It takes into account the following points: 
the user must have control on his personal data, a great 
number of certificates must be provided  at  low cost, 
multiple services may belong to distinct groups  and 
accessible via various material supports like usb key, smart 
card or a mobile equipment. FC² tries to bring a solution to 
these requirements by implementing a comprehensive 
platform that allows new secure electronic services based 
on a transparent and interoperable federated identity 
management. 
In this context, a new PKI
1
Our contribution, in this paper, concerns the "user" PKI 
that integrates an entity called “electronic notary” used 
instead of a certification authority, allowing the 
registration of new users (citizen/consumer/professional) 
within a registration authority that may be a proximity 
agency (telecom agency, banking agency) viewed as a trust 
third party. The proposed crypto-system is based on the 
same principle whatever asymmetric algorithm is used. 
The local registration authority delivers a "public key 
certificate" to the user along with a private key using his 
usb key, his smart card or his cell phone. The local 
-based protocol, called "2.0", 
has been proposed to guarantee secure access to electronic 
services at low cost. 
Based on three levels, FC² project integrates: 
- An international PKI that delivers and manages server 
certificates for identity providers, service providers and 
attribute providers. 
- An internal PKI deployed by each registration authority 
(associated to each circle of trust) for all its agencies. 
- A "user" PKI that addresses final users. 
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registration authority uploads user’s "public key ownership 
certificate" to its central electronic notary server through a 
secure channel. Thus, anyone, any IDP, any application 
and any process can request this electronic notary server to 
authenticate the digital identity of the user. This trusted 
user is now able to access, at any time services belonging 
to distinct circles of trust, federated by FC² system in a 
transparent manner.  
The topic of trust and PKI management has been addressed 
during the last few years like in [7], [8], [9], [10].  For 
example, John Linn in [7] presents and compares several 
trust models and applied for use with public-key certificate 
infrastructures based on the X.509 specification, including 
subordinated  hierarchies, cross-certified  CA, hybrid  CA, 
bridge CAs, and trust lists. More recent works deal with 
identity management systems and focus on the use of PKI 
within a federated architecture like in Liberty Alliance 
[11]. Another work on Liberty Alliance targeted a pan-
European multi Circle of Trust environment [12]. 
On the other hand, Windows CardSpace delivered with 
recent versions of .NET Framework  manages identities 
according to a user-centric approach [13]. A more 
sophisticated work introduces  a formal semantics based 
calculus of trust that explicitly represents trust and 
quantifies the risk associated with trust in PKI and identity 
management  [14]. However, all these research works 
targeted a particular identity management system. Since 
CardSpace and Liberty Alliance are not interoperable, 
Jorstad et al. in [15] tried to integrate  the  current  SIM 
authentication  used  in GSM with  both  Liberty Alliance  
and CardSpace  such  that  it  can  be  used  for  Internet  
services. Unfortunately this work is limited to mobile 
equipments and is not used with other physical supports. 
The PKI-based approach proposed in this paper allows 
managing different circles of trust defined in FC² project 
while each circle may adopt any identity management 
system independently from the system used by other circles 
of trust. Moreover, with our solution the user may access 
to FC² services after registration and authentication phase 
thanks to any physical support (smart card, USB key, cell 
phone, etc.) he has. 
In the rest of this paper, Section 2 recalls the objective of 
FC² platform. Section 3 describes the user-centric  PKI-
based approach that is proposed to access electronic 
services of different circles of trust while guaranteeing 
security at low cost. Section 4 details the way keys and 
certificates are generated and used. Section 5 explains the 
role of each involved actor through distinct use cases. 
Section 6 outlines the implemented software architecture, 
before concluding in Section 7. 
2. The FC² project 
The FC² project (see Figure 1) is a French R&D cross-
sector initiative including  companies, government and 
academic actors.  
The project started on July 2007 and ended on June 2010. 
It aimed to: 
•  Define and implement interoperable identity 
federation architecture schemes, fully agnostic versus 
underlying technologies (Liberty Alliance [2], 
Microsoft/Cardspace [3], Higgins [4], Open-ID [5], 
etc.), 
•  Implement a dedicated infrastructure for service 
providers enrolment and support, 
•  Provide strong authentication and privacy 
management services, 
•  Provide a high level of protection against digital 
identity attacks, 
•  Provide a  simple and convenient user experience, 
targeting user empowerment and trust as well as 
universality of use across a large variety of end-user 
devices, 
•  Create innovative business models, acceptable and/or 
adoptable by all players in the value chain, 
•  Provide the needed technologies and processes to 
master identity management technologies on a large 
scale basis, from national/government level to 
corporate/enterprise level. 
The R&D developments within the project targeted 
especially the problems of Federated Identities in a cross-
sector environment, encompassing the e-government, local 
administrations, telecommunications and financial 
domains.  
Regarding the FC² issues, the interoperability of various 
identity-management technologies and the user privacy 
have been addressed through research works undertaken by 
FC² partners, like in [5] and [6]. 
In this paper, we focus on the access to on-line services 
within a federated identity platform while allowing secure, 
low-cost, and user-centric properties. 
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Fig.1. FC² architecture 
3. PKI 2.0 
3.1 The FC² context 
As for any PKI, the main objective is naturally to ensure 
data exchange confidentiality, integrity and authenticity 
along with strong authentication of the actors. The non-
functional objectives are the fact of allowing the 
materialization of trust within FC² framework, between 
distinct circles of trust and the user. It was decided in FC² 
project, not to impose higher certification authority nor 
hierarchy between the circles of trust, but to provide a 
security solution that may be collaborative between the 
actors, and that may be evolutionary, flexible for the 
integration of new partners (circles). The PKI-based 
solution that is deployed uses three levels: 
• A bridge PKI: to which is assigned a certificate that is 
auto-signed or delivered by a known CA which signs for a 
given circle of trust the certificate of the internal CA. 
• An international PKI: to deliver the public certificates of 
identity providers and attribute providers when 
communicating with users or electronic notaries.  
• An internal PKI: with a root certificate auto-signed and a 
certificate signed by the bridge CA  certificate; this PKI 
signs the certificates of the identity and attribute providers 
for their inter-circle communication, and those of each 
registration authority and each electronic notary when 
communicating each other.  
3.2 PKI 2.0 principle 
Our contribution concerns a protocol called PKI 2.0  to 
register new users within the FC² platform. It consists of 
two parts. The enrolment phase involves the registration of 
new users and the generation of keys and certificates. The 
verification phase that assumes the publication of new 
public-key ownership certificates on an electronic server 
acting as a notary that checks the validity of the user 
certificates.   
The first step concerns the Registration Authority (RA) that 
allows registering new users. The RA must have multiple 
proximity agencies distributed over the territory. In the real 
world, the RA and the proximity agencies are the following 
according to the circle of trust considered: In the 
governmental circle, the RA corresponds to “les Notaires 
de France” and the proximity agencies are notaries. In the 
banking circle, the RA  is the bank and the proximity 
agencies are the banking agencies. In the telecom circle, 
the RA is the telecom operator and the proximity agencies 
are the local telecom agencies.   
RA has the role of checking the identity of the user, and of 
executing a dedicated procedure to deliver finally an auto-
signed public-key certificate and a "public-key ownership 
certificate". In such model, the cost is low since that 
certification authorities are not necessary. 
In our solution, the user holds his key pair and his 
certificates (certificate of public-key and certificate of 
public-key ownership) generated by the proximity agency 
called the Local Registration Agency (LRA). The 
certificate of public-key ownership published by a LRA on 
the Electronic Notary (EN) server is used to check the 
validity of the auto-signed certificate of public key. To 
distinguish them from the certificates generated by a 
server, they are called “customer” certificates. The user 
can use his certificates for encryption, authentication or 
signature. 
This protocol avoids the use of a certification authority to 
the benefit of the EN  server. No certificate from 
registration authority is necessary since the user certificate 
is auto-signed. However, the LRA  checks the certificate 
generation and insures the secured publication  of the 
corresponding ownership certificate on the EN server. The 
auto-signature of a certificate does not bring any guarantee 
on its validity, it only insures to be in compliance with the 
standard X509v3 so as to be used by existing applications. 
In fact, the certificate validity is obtained on-line by 
requesting the EN server. 
4. PKI 2.0 keys and certificates 
In this section, we explain how keys and certificates are 
generated, and how the enrolment is performed. 
4.1 Key-pair generation 
To have a PKI 2.0 certificate, each user must have a pair of 
keys.  The key generation can be done according to 
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-  personal way: the user runs  locally a software tool 
provided by FC². This software corresponds to an identity 
selector installed on his machine or his cell phone. 
- decentralized way: the user goes physically to a Local 
Registration Agency that generates keys for him. 
- centralized way (not recommended): a RA - one by circle 
of trust - generates the keys for each person. 
At this stage, the user has two keys: a public key Kpub and 
a private key Kpriv. 
 
4.2 Certificates Generation 
The PKI 2.0 recommends for each user two pairs of keys, 
one pair is dedicated for self authentication and electronic 
signature and the other pair for encryption. These pairs of 
keys have to be stored in secure way, especially for the 
private keys.  
The public-key certificates X509v3 are auto-signed and 
stored in plain text. The first one is an 
authentication/signature certificate whose legal value rises 
from European directive 1999/93. The second one is 
dedicated to encryption. 
The generation of certificates can be also carried out 
according to a personal, centralized or decentralized way. 
However, the decentralized procedure is the optimal way 
since  it allows the generation of a public-key certificate 
and a public-key ownership certificate that guarantees the 
authenticity of the latter. These certificates are added to the 
information system for the first time during the enrolment 
phase. 
4.3 Enrolment operation 
The user enrolment process is done directly within a Local 
Registration Agency (LRA) according to three steps: 
- First step: checking user identity 
The user presents one or more identity documents to the 
registration agent that physically authenticates user. This 
face-to-face  step is easy to realize within FC² project 
thanks to the LRA that are distributed over the territory. 
- Second step: Generating public-key certificate 
Once the user identity is checked, the registration agent 
launches the public-key certificate generation after having 
generated the corresponding key pair. This certificate 
contains: third party nationality (FR),  third party type 
(registration agency), third party circle of trust, time-
stamping (validity period of the certificate), user identity, 
public key, auto-signature (with the user private key). Once 
the certificate is generated, the registration agent must 
register it on the user physical  device  (USB key, smart 
card or cell phone). 
-  Third step: Generating certificate of public-key 
ownership 
PKI 2.0 principle is that the consumer/citizen is 
responsible for certifying the ownership of his public key 
without involving any certification authority. For this 
purpose, PKI 2.0 adds a new certificate, called "public-key 
ownership certificate". This certificate does not contain the 
user public key. Instead, it contains the hash value of the 
public key (by using a hash function like MD5, SHA-1 or 
RIPE-MD). Hence, a certificate of public-key ownership 
contains: nationality of the third party (FR), type of the 
third party (registration agent), third party circle of trust, 
time-stamping, user identity, public key hash value. Once 
generated, this certificate is encrypted with the user private 
key. 
The following section describes the different entities 
involved in the infrastructure. 
5. Principal actors and use cases  
PKI 2.0 gathers the following actors: LRA,  EN  servers, 
service providers, and finally users.  The local agencies 
and servers of each circle of trust have an internal PKI 
which delivers the necessary certificates to establish a SSL 
communication. The electronic-notary servers have also 
certificates issued by a known certification authority for 
communication between them and users or  service 
providers. Figure 2 illustrates the general architecture of 
the PKI 2.0 including the main actors and the interactions 
between them. 
 
Fig.2. PKI 2.0 Architecture overview 
 
4.4 Main actors  
User entity 
The user, as consumer or citizen, is linked to a circle of 
trust. First of all, he has to register himself within a LRA to 
access the system, it’s the enrolment phase. Afterwards, he 
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own account (update, revoke or renew). Of course, he is 
also able to check any public-key certificates on any EN 
servers delivered by any RA of any circles of trust. 
 
Local Registration Agency 
This entity manages clients’ enrolment by generating 
certificates and publishing and deleting  of public-key 
ownership certificates onto the EN server.  
 
Electronic Notary server 
The EN server contains a register of ownership certificates. 
It is requested by other actors to authenticate the public-
key certificates. Indeed, it stores the public-key ownership 
certificates published by LRA. The communication by a EN 
and a LRA is secured thanks to SSL certificates delivered 
by an internal PKI. EN server is requested to verify the 
users public-key certificates delivered by its own LRAs.   
 
Service Providers 
The service providers correspond to the web sites where 
users are identified using their public-key certificate. These 
providers ask EN to check the public-key certificates used 
by users to access the provided services. 
 
Identity providers 
The identity provider, one per circle of trust, stores public-
key certificates of PKI 2.0 generated by LRA. The 
publication of these certificates is done automatically 
thanks to a software module integrated within the user 
identity selector.  
 
5.1 Use Cases 
New users enrolment  
As stated before, this step is the first one allowing the user 
to access to FC² platform. It is performed by the user 
within a LRA. First of all, the user is authenticated by 
presenting an identity document. Once authenticated, 
several steps may be carried out in order to issue the 
public-key certificate, that is, to:   
- register the user in a database which contains the list of 
users.  The information stored in the data base are: 
Common Name, gender, date of birth, postal address and 
e-mail. These data items are inserted automatically into the 
certificates generated as in the following steps. 
-  generate the public-key certificate, that is auto-signed 
with the private key of the user. 
-  register the public-key certificate  (in . P12  and  .cer 
formats) on the physical device of the user. 
- generate the public-key ownership certificate under .P12 
format, and finally encrypt this certificate using the private 
key of the user. 
 
Publication of public-key ownership certificate 
The public-key ownership certificate allows checking the 
authenticity of the public key through the hash value of this 
latter that is inserted into the certificate. This certificate 
must be published onto the EN server. This is done thanks 
to SSL communication with the NE  server. The SSL 
authentication is done mutually by using SSL certificates 
generated by the internal PKI. Once the mutual 
authentication is achieved successfully, a message is sent 
to EN with the following information: 
 
{ } { }
EN i LRA i Kpub Kpriv LRA M H M Id ) ( , ,  
 
Where IdLRAi
{ } { }
EN i LRA i Kpub Kpriv LRA M H M Id ) ( , ,
 : is the identity of the LRA i,  
M : the message contains the ownership certificate 
encrypted with the private key of the user, and other 
information like : serial number, version, signature 
algorithm. 
H(M) :  the hash value of M. All these information are 
encrypted with the public key of EN. 
The use of the signature enables us to guarantee the 
message integrity. The encryption with the public key of 
EN  guarantees confidentiality since that only the 
appropriate EN will decrypt the message. Upon receiving 
the message, the EN begins decrypting the message using 
its private key, and then checks the signature. For this 
purpose, the EN  reads the identity of the sending LRA 
because it has a register of all the public-key certificates of 
his local agencies, indexed with their serial number. Then, 
EN begins extracting the certificate that contains the public 
key of the concerned LRA, in order to verify the signature. 
EN computes the hash value of M and compares it to the 
one received. If they are equal, EN stores the certificate of 
ownership in its database, otherwise an error message is 
notified to the LRA. 
 
User account management  
This task concerns the update, delete and read operations 
carried out on the user account. The update may concern 
the modification of some personal information or even the 
generation of a public-key certificate with the new 
information. The account deletion implies the deletion of 
the public-key ownership  certificate  within  EN. In this 
case, the LRA sends the following message to inform EN 
about the revocation: 
 
Where  M={serial number of public-key certificate, 
removal} 
The renewal of the public-key certificate is necessary after 
removal. 
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This operation allows user, identity provider, or service 
provider to check a public-key certificate in real time, in 
order to access an Internet service or to exchange data with 
another actor. The verification process is done as in the 
following: 
- request a EN server whose the address is in the certificate 
using a SSL communication and authentication with the 
concerned EN 
-  the  public-key  certificate is sent to the already 
authenticated EN 
- then EN extracts the serial number that is also the serial 
number of the public-key ownership certificate, 
- EN looks at the public-key ownership certificate in its 
data base, 
- if the public-key ownership certificate is found in the data 
base,    EN  tries to decrypt the public-key ownership 
certificate with the public-key extracted from the 
given/received public-key certificate, 
-  if the public-key ownership certificate has been 
successfully opened, EN extracts the hash value from the 
public-key ownership certificate, and compares it with the 
one computed with the public key contained in the 
received certificate.  If they are equal, the verification is 
successful.  
As described in the following section, an implementation 
of PKI 2.0 has been performed. 
6. Software architecture 
We implemented the PKI 2.0 by developing three 
modules:  the first module proposes a tool for the LRA. It 
allows to manage user accounts and to control the 
publication of ownership certificates on the EN server. As 
an example, Figure 4 illustrates the case of adding a new 
user into a circle of trust. The second module is devoted to 
the EN, it is composed of two programs: one to answer the 
publishing requests from his Local Registration Agencies, 
and the other to answer the check requests from  any 
service providers and any  users. The third module is 
devoted to external customers (users, IDP  and service 
providers) that want to check a public-key certificate of 
PKI 2.0 (see Figure 3). 
7. Conclusion 
Our PKI-based solution seems to be an answer to the FC² 
needs in terms of security. This proposal is a user-centric 
system that fulfills the requirements of a large number of 
users at low costs. Moreover, the PKI 2.0 solves the 
problem of managing multiple digital identities by 
allowing the use of only one or few  identities within 
several circles of trust, by replacing Certification 
Authorities by Registration Authorities that have proximity 
agencies easily accessible to citizens/consumers. 
As a perspective to our work, we aim to develop the 
module of checking as a plugin to Web browsers. 
 
Fig.3. Checking a public-key certificate 
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